ZIP: 227
Title: Issuance of Zcash Shielded Assets
Owners: Pablo Kogan <pablo@qed-it.com>
        Vivek Arte <vivek@qed-it.com>
        Daira-Emma Hopwood <daira-emma@electriccoin.co>
        Jack Grigg <str4d@electriccoin.co>
Credits: Daniel Benarroch
         Aurelien Nicolas
         Deirdre Connolly
         Teor
Status: Draft
Category: Consensus
Created: 2022-05-01
License: MIT
Discussions-To: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/issues/618>
Pull-Request: <https://github.com/zcash/zips/pull/680>

Terminology

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 1 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals.

The term "network upgrade" in this document is to be interpreted as described in ZIP 200 7.

The terms "Orchard" and "Action" in this document are to be interpreted as described in ZIP 224 8.

We define the following additional terms:

Abstract

This ZIP (ZIP 227) proposes the Zcash Shielded Assets (ZSA) protocol, in conjunction with ZIP 226 9. This protocol is an extension of the Orchard protocol that enables the creation, transfer and burn of Custom Assets on the Zcash chain. The creation of such Assets is defined in this ZIP (ZIP 227), while the transfer and burn of such Assets is defined in ZIP 226 9. This ZIP must only be implemented in conjunction with ZIP 226 9. The proposed issuance mechanism is only valid for the Orchard-ZSA transfer protocol, because it produces notes that can only be transferred under ZSA.

Motivation

This ZIP introduces the issuance mechanism for Custom Assets on the Zcash chain. While originally part of a single ZSA ZIP, the issuance mechanism turned out to be substantial enough to stand on its own and justify the creation of this supporting ZIP for ZIP 226 9.

This ZIP only enables transparent issuance. As a first step, transparency will allow for proper testing of the applications that will be most used in the Zcash ecosystem, and will enable the supply of Assets to be tracked.

The issuance mechanism described in this ZIP is broad enough for issuers to either create Assets on Zcash (i.e. Assets that originate on the Zcash blockchain), as well as for institutions to create bridges from other chains and import Wrapped Assets. This enables what we hope will be a useful set of applications.

Use Cases

The design presented in this ZIP enables issuance of shielded Assets in various modes:

See the Concrete Applications section for more details.

Requirements

Specification: Issuance Keys and Issuance Authorization Signature Scheme

The Orchard-ZSA Protocol adds the following keys to the key components 18 19:

  1. The issuance authorizing key, denoted as \(\mathsf{isk}\!\) , is the key used to authorize the issuance of Asset Identifiers by a given issuer, and is only used by that issuer.
  2. The issuance validating key, denoted as \(\mathsf{ik}\!\) , is the key that is used to validate issuance transactions. This key is used to validate the issuance of Asset Identifiers by a given issuer, and is used by all blockchain users (specifically the owners of notes for that Asset, and consensus validators) to associate the Asset in question with the issuer.

The relations between these keys are shown in the following diagram:

Diagram of Issuance Key Components for the Orchard-ZSA Protocol

Issuance Authorization Signature Scheme

We instantiate the issuance authorization signature scheme \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}\) as a BIP-340 Schnorr signature over the secp256k1 curve. The signing and validation algorithms, signature encoding, and public key encoding MUST follow BIP 340 16.

Batch verification MAY be used. Precomputation MAY be used if and only if it produces equivalent results; for example, for a given verification key \(pk\) and \(\mathit{lift\_x}(\mathit{int}(pk))\) MAY be precomputed.

We define the constants as per the secp256k1 standard parameters, as described in BIP 340.

The associated types of the \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}\) signature scheme are as follows:

  • \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Message} = \mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[\mathbb{N}]}}\)
  • \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Signature} = \mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[64]}} \cup \{\bot\}\)
  • \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Public} = \mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[32]}} \cup \{\bot\}\)
  • \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Private} = \mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[32]}}\)

where \(\mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[k]}}\) denotes the set of sequences of \(k\) bytes, and \(\mathbb{B}^{\mathbb{Y}^{[\mathbb{N}]}}\) denotes the type of byte sequences of arbitrary length, as defined in the Zcash protocol specification 17.

The issuance authorizing key generation algorithm and the issuance validating key derivation algorithm are defined in the Issuance Key Derivation section, while the corresponding signing and validation algorithms are defined in the Issuance Authorization Signing and Validation section.

Issuance Key Derivation

Issuance authorizing key generation for hierarchical deterministic wallets

The issuance authorizing key is generated using the Orchard master key derivation procedure defined in ZIP 32 3. We reuse the functions defined there in what follows in this section.

Let \(S\) be a seed byte sequence of a chosen length, which MUST be at least 32 and at most 252 bytes. We define the master extended issuance key \(m_{\mathsf{Issuance}} := \mathsf{MasterKeyGen}(\texttt{"ZIP32ZSAIssue_V1"}, S)\!\) .

As in ZIP 32 for Orchard 4, we only use hardened child key derivation for the issuance authorizing key. We reuse the \(\mathsf{CDKsk}\) function for Orchard child key derivation from ZIP 32.

We use the notation of ZIP 32 6 for shielded HD paths, and define the issuance authorizing key path as \(m_{\mathsf{Issuance}} / \mathit{purpose}' / \mathit{coin\_type}' / \mathit{account}'\!\) . We fix the path levels as follows:

  • \(\mathit{purpose}\) : a constant set to \(227\) (i.e. \(\mathtt{0xe3}\!\) ). \(\mathit{purpose}'\) is thus \(227'\) (or \(\mathtt{0x800000e3}\!\) ) following the BIP 43 recommendation.
  • \(\mathit{coin\_type}\) : Defined as in ZIP 32 5.
  • \(\mathit{account}\) : fixed to index \(0\!\) .

From the generated \((\mathsf{sk}, \mathsf{c})\!\) , we set the issuance authorizing key to be \(\mathsf{isk} := \mathsf{sk}\!\) .

Derivation of issuance validating key

Define \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{DerivePublic}\; : \; (\mathsf{isk}\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Private}) \to \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Public}\) as:

  • \(\mathsf{ik} := \textit{PubKey}(\mathsf{isk})\)
  • Return \(\bot\) if the \(\textit{PubKey}\) algorithm invocation fails, otherwise return \(\mathsf{ik}\!\) .

where the \(\textit{PubKey}\) algorithm is defined in BIP 340 16. Note that the byte representation of \(\mathsf{ik}\) is in big-endian order as defined in BIP 340.

It is possible for the \(\textit{PubKey}\) algorithm to fail with very low probability, which means that \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{DerivePublic}\) could return \(\bot\) with very low probability. If this happens, discard the keys and repeat with a different \(\mathsf{isk}\!\) .

This allows the issuer to use the same wallet it usually uses to transfer Assets, while keeping a disconnect from the other keys. Specifically, this method is aligned with the requirements and motivation of ZIP 32 2. It provides further anonymity and the ability to delegate issuance of an Asset (or in the future, generate a multi-signature protocol) while the rest of the keys remain in the wallet safe.

Issuance Authorization Signing and Validation

Define \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Sign}\; : \; (\mathsf{isk}\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Private}) \times (M\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Message}) \to \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Signature}\) as:

  • Let the auxiliary data \(a = [\mathtt{0x00}]^{32}\!\) .
  • Let \(\text{σ} = \mathsf{Sign}(\mathsf{isk}, M)\!\) .
  • Return \(\bot\) if the \(\mathsf{Sign}\) algorithm fails in the previous step, otherwise return \(\text{σ}\!\) .

where the \(\mathsf{Sign}\) algorithm is defined in BIP 340 and \(a\) denotes the auxiliary data used in BIP 340 16. Note that \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Sign}\) could return \(\bot\) with very low probability.

Define \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Validate}\; : \; (\mathsf{ik}\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Public}) \times (M\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Message}) \times (\text{σ}\; : \; \mathsf{IssueAuthSig}.\!\mathsf{Signature}) \to \mathbb{B}\) as:

  • Return \(0\) if \(\text{σ} = \bot\!\) .
  • Return \(1\) if \(\mathsf{Verify}(\mathsf{ik}, M, \text{σ})\) succeeds, otherwise \(0\!\) .

where the \(\mathsf{Verify}\) algorithm is defined in BIP 340 16.

Specification: Asset Identifier

For every new Asset, there must be a new and unique Asset Identifier, denoted \(\mathsf{AssetId}\!\) . We define this to be a globally unique pair \(\mathsf{AssetId} := (\mathsf{ik}, \mathsf{asset\_desc})\!\) , where \(\mathsf{ik}\) is the issuance key and \(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\) is a byte string.

A given Asset Identifier is used across all Zcash protocols that support ZSAs -- that is, the Orchard-ZSA protocol and potentially future Zcash shielded protocols. For this Asset Identifier, we derive an Asset Digest, \(\mathsf{AssetDigest}\!\) , which is simply is a \(\textsf{BLAKE2b-512}\) hash of the Asset Identifier. From the Asset Digest, we derive a specific Asset Base within each shielded protocol using the applicable hash-to-curve algorithm. This Asset Base is included in shielded notes.

Let

Define \(\mathsf{AssetDigest_{AssetId}} := \textsf{BLAKE2b-512}(\texttt{"ZSA-Asset-Digest"},\; \mathsf{EncodeAssetId}(\mathsf{AssetId}))\!\) , where

Define \(\mathsf{AssetBase_{AssetId}} := \mathsf{ZSAValueBase}(\mathsf{AssetDigest_{AssetId}})\)

In the case of the Orchard-ZSA protocol, we define \(\mathsf{ZSAValueBase}(\mathsf{AssetDigest_{AssetId}}) := \mathsf{GroupHash}^\mathbb{P}(\texttt{"z.cash:OrchardZSA"}, \mathsf{AssetDigest_{AssetId}})\) where \(\mathsf{GroupHash}^\mathbb{P}\) is defined as in 20.

The relations between the Asset Identifier, Asset Digest, and Asset Base are shown in the following diagram:

Diagram relating the Asset Identifier, Asset Digest, and Asset Base in the ZSA Protocol

Note: To keep notations light and concise, we may omit \(\mathsf{AssetId}\) (resp. \(\mathsf{Protocol}\!\) ) in the subscript (resp. superscript) when the Asset Identifier (resp. Protocol) is clear from the context.

Wallets MUST NOT display just the \(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\) string to their users as the name of the Asset. Some possible alternatives include:

Specification: Global Issuance State

Issuance requires the following additions to the global state defined at block boundaries:

Specification: Issuance Action, Issuance Bundle and Issuance Protocol

Issuance Action Description

An issuance action, IssueAction, is the instance of issuing a specific Custom Asset, and contains the following fields:

  • assetDescSize: the size of the Asset description, a number between \(0\) and \(512\!\) , stored in two bytes.
  • asset_desc: the Asset description, a byte string of up to 512 bytes as defined in the Specification: Asset Identifier section.
  • vNotes: an array of Note containing the unencrypted output notes of the recipients of the Asset.
  • flagsIssuance: a byte that stores the \(\mathsf{finalize}\) boolean that defines whether the issuance of that specific Custom Asset is finalized or not.

An asset's \(\mathsf{AssetDigest}\) is added to the \(\mathsf{previously\_finalized}\) set after a block that contains any issuance transaction for that asset with \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!\) . It then cannot be removed from this set. For Assets with \(\mathsf{AssetDigest} \in \mathsf{previously\_finalized}\!\) , no further tokens can be issued, so as seen below, the validators will reject the transaction. For Assets with \(\mathsf{AssetDigest} \not\in \mathsf{previously\_finalized}\!\) , new issuance actions can be issued in future transactions. These must use the same Asset description, \(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\!\) , and can either maintain \(\mathsf{finalize} = 0\) or change it to \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!\) , denoting that this Custom Asset cannot be issued after the containing block.

Bytes Name Data Type Description
2 assetDescSize byte The length of the asset_desc string in bytes.
assetDescSize asset_desc byte[assetDescSize] A byte sequence of length assetDescSize bytes which SHOULD be a well-formed UTF-8 code unit sequence according to Unicode 15.0.0 or later.
varies nNotes compactSize The number of notes in the issuance action.
noteSize * nNotes vNotes Note[nNotes] A sequence of note descriptions within the issuance action, where noteSize is the size, in bytes, of a Note.
1 flagsIssuance byte
An 8-bit value representing a set of flags. Ordered from LSB to MSB:
  • \(\mathsf{finalize}\)
  • The remaining bits are set to \(0\!\) .

We note that the output note commitment of the recipient's notes are not included in the actual transaction, but when added to the global state of the chain, they will be added to the note commitment tree as a shielded note. This prevents future usage of the note from being linked to the issuance transaction, as the nullifier key is not known to the validators and chain observers.

Issuance Bundle

An issuance bundle, IssueBundle, is the aggregate of all the issuance-related information. Specifically, contains all the issuance actions and the issuer signature on the transaction SIGHASH that validates the issuance itself. It contains the following fields:

  • \(\mathsf{ik}\) : the issuance validating key, that allows the validators to verify that the \(\mathsf{AssetId}\) is properly associated with the issuer.
  • vIssueActions: an array of issuance actions, of type IssueAction.
  • \(\mathsf{issueAuthSig}\) : the signature of the transaction SIGHASH, signed by the issuance authorizing key, \(\mathsf{isk}\!\) , that validates the issuance.

The issuance bundle is then added within the transaction format as a new bundle. That is, issuance requires the addition of the following information to the transaction format 22.

Bytes Name Data Type Description
varies nIssueActions compactSize The number of issuance actions in the bundle.
IssueActionSize * nIssueActions vIssueActions IssueAction[nIssueActions] A sequence of issuance action descriptions, where IssueActionSize is the size, in bytes, of an IssueAction description.
32 ik byte[32] The issuance validating key of the issuer, used to validate the signature.
64 issueAuthSig byte[64] The signature of the transaction SIGHASH, signed by the issuer, validated as in Issuance Authorization Signature Scheme.

Issuance Protocol

The issuer program performs the following operations:

For all actions IssueAction:

  • encode \(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\) as a UTF-8 byte string of size up to 512.
  • compute \(\mathsf{AssetDigest}\) from the issuance validating key \(\mathsf{ik}\) and \(\mathsf{asset\_desc}\) as decribed in the Specification: Asset Identifier section.
  • compute \(\mathsf{AssetBase}\) from \(\mathsf{AssetDigest}\) as decribed in the Specification: Asset Identifier section.
  • set the \(\mathsf{finalize}\) boolean as desired (if more issuance actions are to be created for this \(\mathsf{AssetBase}\!\) , set \(\mathsf{finalize} = 0\!\) , otherwise set \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!\) ).
  • for each recipient \(i\) :
    • generate a ZSA output note that includes the Asset Base. For an Orchard-ZSA note this is \(\mathsf{note}_i = (\mathsf{d}_i, \mathsf{pk}_{\mathsf{d}_i}, \mathsf{v}_i, \text{ρ}_i, \mathsf{rseed}_i, \mathsf{AssetBase}, \mathsf{rcm}_i)\!\) .
  • encode the IssueAction into the vector vIssueActions of the bundle.

For the IssueBundle:

  • encode the vIssueActions vector.
  • encode the \(\mathsf{ik}\) as 32 byte-string.
  • sign the SIGHASH transaction hash with the issuance authorizing key, \(\mathsf{isk}\!\) , using the \(\mathsf{IssueAuthSig}\) signature scheme. The signature is then added to the issuance bundle.

Note: that the commitment is not included in the IssuanceAction itself. As explained below, it is computed later by the validators and added to the note commitment tree.

Specification: Consensus Rule Changes

For the IssueBundle:

For each IssueAction in IssueBundle:

If all of the above checks pass, do the following:

Rationale

The following is a list of rationale for different decisions made in the proposal:

Concrete Applications

Asset Features

  • By using the \(\mathsf{finalize}\) boolean and the burning mechanism defined in 9, issuers can control the supply production of any Asset associated to their issuer keys. For example,
    • by setting \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\) from the first issuance action for that Asset Identifier, the issuer is in essence creating a one-time issuance transaction. This is useful when the max supply is capped from the beginning and the distribution is known in advance. All tokens are issued at once and distributed as needed.
  • Issuers can also stop the existing supply production of any Asset associated to their issuer keys. This could be done by
    • issuing a last set of tokens of that specific \(\mathsf{AssetId}\!\) , for which \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\!\) , or by
    • issuing a transaction with a single note in the issuance action pertaining to that \(\mathsf{AssetId}\!\) , where the note will contain a \(\mathsf{value} = 0\!\) . This can be used for application-specific purposes (NFT collections) or for security purposes to revoke the Asset issuance (see Security and Privacy Considerations).
    • Note in the above cases, that the setting of the \(\mathsf{finalize}\) flag will take effect at the block boundary, that is, after all the transactions in the block.
  • The issuance and burn mechanisms can be used in conjunction to determine the supply of Assets on the Zcash ecosystem. This allows for the bridging of Assets defined on other chains.
  • Furthermore, NFT issuance is enabled by issuing in a single bundle several issuance actions, where each \(\mathsf{AssetId}\) corresponds to \(\mathsf{value} = 1\) at the fundamental unit level. Issuers and users should make sure that \(\mathsf{finalize} = 1\) for each of the actions in this scenario.

TxId Digest - Issuance

This section details the construction of the subtree of hashes in the transaction digest that corresponds to issuance transaction data. Details of the overall changes to the transaction digest due to the Orchard-ZSA protocol can be found in ZIP 226 11. As in ZIP 244 12, the digests are all personalized BLAKE2b-256 hashes, and in cases where no elements are available for hashing, a personalized hash of the empty byte array is used.

A new issuance transaction digest algorithm is defined that constructs the subtree of the transaction digest tree of hashes for the issuance portion of a transaction. Each branch of the subtree will correspond to a specific subset of issuance transaction data. The overall structure of the hash is as follows; each name referenced here will be described in detail below:

issuance_digest
├── issue_actions_digest
│   ├── issue_notes_digest
│   ├── assetDescription
│   └── flagsIssuance
└── issuanceValidatingKey

In the specification below, nodes of the tree are presented in depth-first order.

T.5: issuance_digest

A BLAKE2b-256 hash of the following values

T.5a: issue_actions_digest    (32-byte hash output)
T.5b: issuanceValidatingKey   (32 bytes)

The personalization field of this hash is set to:

"ZTxIdSAIssueHash"

In case the transaction has no issuance components, ''issue_actions_digest'' is:

BLAKE2b-256("ZTxIdSAIssueHash", [])

T.5a: issue_actions_digest

A BLAKE2b-256 hash of Issue Action information for all Issuance Actions belonging to the transaction. For each Action, the following elements are included in the hash:

T.5a.i  : notes_digest            (32-byte hash output)
T.5a.ii : assetDescription        (field encoding bytes)
T.5a.iii: flagsIssuance           (1 byte)

The personalization field of this hash is set to:

"ZTxIdIssuActHash"
T.5a.i: issue_notes_digest

A BLAKE2b-256 hash of Note information for all Notes belonging to the Issuance Action. For each Note, the following elements are included in the hash:

T.5a.i.1: recipient                    (field encoding bytes)
T.5a.i.2: value                        (field encoding bytes)
T.5a.i.3: assetBase                    (field encoding bytes)
T.5a.i.4: rho                          (field encoding bytes)
T.5a.i.5: rseed                        (field encoding bytes)

The personalization field of this hash is set to:

"ZTxIdIAcNoteHash"
T.5a.i.1: recipient

This is the raw encoding of an Orchard shielded payment address as defined in the protocol specification 21.

T.5a.i.2: value

Note value encoded as little-endian 8-byte representation of 64-bit unsigned integer (e.g. u64 in Rust) raw value.

T.5a.i.3: assetBase

Asset Base encoded as the 32-byte representation of a point on the Pallas curve.

T.5a.i.4: rho

Nullifier encoded as 32-byte representation of a point on the Pallas curve.

T.5a.i.5: rseed

The ZIP 212 32-byte seed randomness for a note.

T.5a.ii: assetDescription

The Asset description byte string.

T.5a.iii: flagsIssuance

An 8-bit value representing a set of flags. Ordered from LSB to MSB:

  • \(\mathsf{finalize}\)
  • The remaining bits are set to 0!.

T.5b: issuanceValidatingKey

A byte encoding of issuance validating key for the bundle as defined in the Issuance Key Derivation section.

Signature Digest

The per-input transaction digest algorithm to generate the signature digest in ZIP 244 13 is modified so that a signature digest is produced for each transparent input, each Sapling input, each Orchard action, and additionally for each Issuance Action. For Issuance Actions, this algorithm has the exact same output as the transaction digest algorithm, thus the txid may be signed directly.

The overall structure of the hash is as follows. We highlight the changes for the Orchard-ZSA protocol via the [ADDED FOR ZSA] text label, and we omit the descriptions of the sections that do not change for the Orchard-ZSA protocol:

signature_digest
├── header_digest
├── transparent_sig_digest
├── sapling_digest
├── orchard_digest
└── issuance_digest         [ADDED FOR ZSA]

signature_digest

A BLAKE2b-256 hash of the following values

S.1: header_digest          (32-byte hash output)
S.2: transparent_sig_digest (32-byte hash output)
S.3: sapling_digest         (32-byte hash output)
S.4: orchard_digest         (32-byte hash output)
S.5: issuance_digest        (32-byte hash output)  [ADDED FOR ZSA]

The personalization field remains the same as in ZIP 244 12.

S.5: issuance_digest

Identical to that specified for the transaction identifier.

Authorizing Data Commitment

The transaction digest algorithm defined in ZIP 244 14 which commits to the authorizing data of a transaction is modified by the Orchard-ZSA protocol to have the following structure. We highlight the changes for the Orchard-ZSA protocol via the [ADDED FOR ZSA] text label, and we omit the descriptions of the sections that do not change for the Orchard-ZSA protocol:

auth_digest
├── transparent_scripts_digest
├── sapling_auth_digest
├── orchard_auth_digest
└── issuance_auth_digest        [ADDED FOR ZSA]

The pair (Transaction Identifier, Auth Commitment) constitutes a commitment to all the data of a serialized transaction that may be included in a block.

auth_digest

A BLAKE2b-256 hash of the following values

A.1: transparent_scripts_digest (32-byte hash output)
A.2: sapling_auth_digest        (32-byte hash output)
A.3: orchard_auth_digest        (32-byte hash output)
A.4: issuance_auth_digest       (32-byte hash output)  [ADDED FOR ZSA]

The personalization field of this hash remains the same as in ZIP 244.

A.4: issuance_auth_digest

In the case that Issuance Actions are present, this is a BLAKE2b-256 hash of the field encoding of the issueAuthSig field of the transaction:

A.4a: issueAuthSig            (field encoding bytes)

The personalization field of this hash is set to:

"ZTxAuthZSAOrHash"

In the case that the transaction has no Orchard Actions, issuance_auth_digest is

BLAKE2b-256("ZTxAuthZSAOrHash", [])

Security and Privacy Considerations

Displaying Asset Identifier information to users

Wallets need to communicate the names of the Assets in a non-confusing way to users, since the byte representation of the Asset Identifier would be hard to read for an end user. Possible solutions are provided in the Specification: Asset Identifier section.

Issuance Key Compromise

The design of this protocol does not currently allow for rotation of the issuance validating key that would allow for replacing the key of a specific Asset. In case of compromise, the following actions are recommended:

  • If an issuance validating key is compromised, the \(\mathsf{finalize}\) boolean for all the Assets issued with that key should be set to \(1\) and the issuer should change to a new issuance authorizing key, and issue new Assets, each with a new \(\mathsf{AssetId}\!\) .

Bridging Assets

For bridging purposes, the secure method of off-boarding Assets is to burn an Asset with the burning mechanism in ZIP 226 9. Users should be aware of issuers that demand the Assets be sent to a specific address on the Zcash chain to be redeemed elsewhere, as this may not reflect the real reserve value of the specific Wrapped Asset.

Other Considerations

Implementing Zcash Nodes

Although not enforced in the global state, it is RECOMMENDED that Zcash full validators keep track of the total supply of Assets as a mutable mapping \(\mathsf{issuanceSupplyInfoMap}\) from \(\mathsf{AssetId}\) to \((\mathsf{totalSupply}, \mathsf{finalize})\) in order to properly keep track of the total supply for different Asset Identifiers. This is useful for wallets and other applications that need to keep track of the total supply of Assets.

Fee Structures

The fee mechanism described in this ZIP will follow the mechanism described in ZIP 317 15.

Test Vectors

Reference Implementation

Deployment

TBD

References

1 Information on BCP 14 — "RFC 2119: Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels" and "RFC 8174: Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"
2 ZIP 32: Shielded Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets
3 ZIP 32: Shielded Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets - Orchard master key generation
4 ZIP 32: Shielded Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets - Orchard child key derivation
5 ZIP 32: Shielded Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets - Key path levels
6 ZIP 32: Shielded Hierarchical Deterministic Wallets - Orchard key path
7 ZIP 200: Network Upgrade Mechanism
8 ZIP 224: Orchard
9 ZIP 226: Transfer and Burn of Zcash Shielded Assets
10 ZIP 226: Transfer and Burn of Zcash Shielded Assets - Note Structure & Commitment
11 ZIP 226: Transfer and Burn of Zcash Shielded Assets - TxId Digest
12 ZIP 244: Transaction Identifier Non-Malleability
13 ZIP 244: Transaction Identifier Non-Malleability: Signature Digest
14 ZIP 244: Transaction Identifier Non-Malleability: Authorizing Data Commitment
15 ZIP 317: Proportional Transfer Fee Mechanism
16 BIP 340: Schnorr Signatures for secp256k1
17 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 2: Notation
18 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 3.1: Payment Addresses and Keys
19 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 4.2.3: Orchard Key Components
20 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 5.4.9.8: Group Hash into Pallas and Vesta
21 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 5.6.4.2: Orchard Raw Payment Addresses
22 Zcash Protocol Specification, Version 2023.4.0. Section 7.1: Transaction Encoding and Consensus (Transaction Version 5)